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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying ac-
tivities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions
of quality of the judiciary, namely eciency and integrity. We present a
multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to
inuence a public decision maker - and possibly the judicial authority
itself, which performs an anti-corruption task - with the payment of
illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of
a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive
the main ndings are to dierent institutional arrangements as to
judicial independence.
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11. Introduction
One of the central concerns about democratic political systems is the lever-
age self-interested groups may claim on actual policies by means of political
inuence-buying and monetary contributions to policy making institutions.
This phenomenon is observed to be pervasive in modern democracies and has
gained a prominent position in the political economy debate.
The role of political inuence was indeed noted since the middle of last
century in the literature on public choice (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock, 1962;
Olson, 1965; Bernholz, 1973; Hillman and Katz, 1987) and political economy
of trade policy and protection (e.g. Hillman, 1982, 1989). From a purely
conjectural standpoint, the seminal contributions of Stigler (1971), Grossman
and Helpman (1994, 2001) and Dixit et al. (1997), have provided a charac-
terization of the public decision maker as an auctioneer who may receive bids
from various entities, in the form of bribes, campaign contributions, or other
alluring incentives. Central to the political economy literature has thereby
been the issue of investigating the equilibrium outcome of the policy making
process in which pressure groups participate actively - through the provision
of contributions to politicians - in order to inuence political decisions.
In some political systems, notably the United States, these transfers may
be perfectly legal and considered to be lobbying, whereas in other systems
the same transfers would be regarded as illegal and accordingly identied as
bribery. Somewhat surprisingly, while in most of the literature lobbying and
bribing can be viewed as the same phenomenon1, little attention has been paid
to the analysis of the inuence on lobbies' ability to impinge on the decision
making process of the existence of a separate government institution, namely
the Judiciary, which is typically tasked with the application of the law and
thus arguably concerned with political corruption.
In this respect, a major shortcoming emerging from the fairly large politi-
cal economy literature on corruption and lobbying stands in that it generally
neglects the active role of the judicial review, while focusing on a single public
decision maker solely - typically a policy-setting body (Laont, 2000). Judicial
review has long been identied as an important component of the checks and
balances against misuse of political power by the executive branch of govern-
ment. In a rational choice perspective, introducing an independent judicial
authority into a lobbying framework raises the question whether - and to what
extent - not overseen judges will undergo pressure from special interest groups.
The present paper attempts to shed some light on this issue by presenting a
multi-layer lobbying framework where policy making emerges as the outcome
1The dierences between lobbying and bribing have not been extensively addressed in the
theoretical literature; in the pioneering work of Grossman and Helpman (1994), lobbying
takes the form of monetary transfers from lobbies to politicians, which could equally be
interpreted as bribes (e.g., Coate and Morris (1999)). Harstad and Svensson (2006) attempt
to draw the boundary by tackling the question why rms choose to lobby - aiming at changing
existing rules or policies - or bribe - attempting to get around existing rules or policies -,
and the consequences of this choice in a growth framework.
2of maximizing the expected net benet of the actors aected by judicial be-
havior. The basic model is as follows. A political authority (bureaucrat) has
discretionary power on the allocation of the tax revenue when faced with multi-
ple projects of public good provision, which in turn benet unequally dierent
groups into which the population aggregates. Lobbying is endogenized in the
context of a political framework where the Politician's payo depends on total
contributions and social welfare, and an organized group is allowed to submit
a complete set of policy-contingent transfers, which take the form of bribes,
to pursue their political aims. We aim at studying how and to what extent
corruption and bribery in the political process can be curbed when vulnerable
to detection from an independent authority - namely, the Judiciary - which
is given the institutional role of ghting corruption embedded in the transfer
of political contributions. To this end, we investigate the equilibrium prop-
erties under complete information of public decision making when accounting
for both this form of multiplicity of public actors involved in the process, and
the possibility that, while being independent of the political authority, the
Judiciary itself may be directly pressured by the lobby2.
Existing work dealing with judicial agency has mostly focused on the cor-
ruption of law enforcers and its implications for the deterrence eectiveness of
laws (e.g., Becker and Stigler, 1974); on the related issues of optimal monitor-
ing and compensation schemes for law enforcers (e.g., Polinsky and Shavell,
2001) and of optimal regulation in the presence of corrupt contract enforcers
(e.g., Immordino and Pagano, forthcoming); on the general contracting prob-
lem under judicial agency in a theoretical perspective (e.g., Bond, 2009). Nev-
ertheless, the question whether the interdependencies between institutions and
the interaction between political corruption at dierent government layers pro-
vides incentives to, alters or removes the lobbying activity, remains largely
unanswered. In Maskin and Tirole (2004) two political entities are separately
introduced in order to investigate peculiar features of a non-representative
authority (the Judge) as an alternative to elective bodies (the Politician),
whereas Hanssen (2004) develops further this subject examining the eects
of their joint presence; in both the cases special interest groups are not present
in the model and only the optimal allocation of power between accountable
and nonaccountable branches of government is assessed.
More closely related to our approach are the recent works of Priks (2007)
and of Mazza and van Winden (2008). The former examines how judicial
dependence inuences corruption at dierent levels of the government in a
model where the central authority, low-level ocials and the judiciary are
potentially corrupt. Our paper diers from Priks (2008) in that we analyze the
issue by means of a menu-auction model in which an organized interest group
acts as principal of both the policy maker and the judiciary, whose behavior is
modeled accordingly. In Mazza and van Winden (2008), an endogenous policy
2Aiming at inuencing the judicial choice to their favour, i.e. toward a less \tightening"
anti-corruption activity to set up. The case where interest groups face the decision of whether
they should lobby the political bodies to switch policy, or rather challenge existing policy
at the judicial authority is developed in Rubin, Curran and Curran (2001).
3model is presented in which public policies are shaped within a hierarchical
government with multiple agents, and several issues involved in the strategic
interaction between sequential decision making and multi-tier lobbying are
addressed accordingly. In the same vein, the present work develops a simple
institutional framework that aims at exploring the political interplay of two
of the fundamental public institutions of modern democratic states which are
assigned dierent tasks within the government arrangement, and the eects of
their interdependencies on strategic behavior of self-interested private actors.
In our analysis, the Judiciary acts as a constraint on the executive, since its
decisions bias the presence (and the magnitude) of the trading process of mon-
etary contributions against economic policy favors or political patronage. The
judicial authority is therefore regarded as an active subject concurring with the
Politician in the determination of public policy. Though we acknowledge the
controversial features of this denition, we follow Posner (1994, 1995) in that,
such a public decision maker is viewed as a rational agent aiming at optimizing
a payo function where some economic variables (revenues and costs) and the
political target of suing illegal activities, are linked together. The incentives of
the judiciary are shaped by their internal structure as well as the institutional
relationship with the political body. Indeed, similarly to Caselli and Morelli
(2004) as for the latter, we measure the quality of Judiciary according to two
substantive dimensions, namely eciency and integrity. The former is dened
in terms of adequate budgetary allocations, sucient number of sta, adequate
training of sta, and it is shown how it directly aects the choice of the level
of the control activity to set up. The latter is dened as the degree of corrupt-
ibility by special interests, which is likely to induce distortions in the eective
choice of the judicial authority. We provide a set of conditions under which
illegal lobbying does not occur - i.e., it does not emerge as an equilibrium out-
come of the underlying game - even in the presence of prone-to-pressure courts.
In particular, we establish that general results on lobbying are not invariant
with respect to multi-participant institutional environments. Our ndings are
in line with those of Dal B o et al. (2006), who show that well-functioning judi-
cial systems increase the cost of corrupt deals whereas slow and/or ineective
judicial systems raise the incentives for engaging in corrupt behavior.
Moreover, we highlight a few implications for the relationship between the
behavior of executives and that of dependent judiciaries. The existence of a
judicial branch of government, which is separate from and, to some degree,
independent of the other branches, is a common feature among democratic
states. Within the literature on separation of powers and political account-
ability (e.g. Alesina and Rosenthal, 1996; Persson et al., 1997), politicians
are viewed as self-interested actors and legislation as a set of contracts be-
tween politicians and powerful interested parties; independence of Judiciary
is thereby thought of as a mechanism for increasing the costs of rent-seeking
activity and reducing the prots of pressure groups. However, a fundamen-
tal paradox highlighted in the economic and political debate on independence
and political interference lies in that independence of judiciaries may in fact
4facilitate corruption in this branch because no other government entity has the
authority to oversee them (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Glaeser and Shleifer,
2002). If the Judiciary is to be an eective instrument to serve as a watch-dog
over the executive, it must be both independent of it and of high integrity, that
is not prone to pressure from politicians or others subjects in the private sector
who benet from a corrupt status quo. If judiciaries are independent, judges
may be biased toward those who make payos out of a corrupt environment;
if dependent, they are likely to be constrained by politicians who have power
over them. The existence of an independent Judiciary can also be regarded as
a key element in the successful functioning of political systems where public
policies emerge from the attempts of interest groups to aect political decisions
in their favour (Landes and Posner, 1975). In our simple setting, independence
of the Judiciary is rather shown to be a necessary requirement for preventing
the interest group and the government body from maximizing prots from the
deals between them.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some evi-
dence and background examples of judicial corruption. The theoretical model
is introduced in section 3, while section 4 carries out the equilibrium analysis.
Section 5 illustrates the case of a dependent Judiciary, when endowing the
political authority with the power to aect its level of eciency or integrity.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
Over the last decades, corruption issues have been given high prominence
within the development and political economy debate. The pioneering work of
Mauro (1995) was one of the rst to show that corruption proves detrimental
to investment and growth. The literature on the causes and the consequences
of corruption on social welfare is by now a large chapter of public economics,
as reviewed in Jain (2001) and Aidt (2003).
The starting point of our analysis is the question whether the structure of
the judiciary plays a role in determining political corruption, under the as-
sumption that judges themselves may be bribe-takers. A growing number of
empirical studies exists which provide motivation to our theoretical investiga-
tion. There is no shortage of evidence about judicial corruption, though often
anecdotal in character. Several instances, especially in the U.S., are indeed
given in which the latter has been detected and its existence proven ex-post
(e.g., McMillan and Zoido, 2004; Bond, 2009). Substantial systematic evi-
dence points to the fact that the rule of law does not apply in many countries
and that judicial decisions are in fact subject to inuence (e.g. Boudreaux
and Pritchard, 1994; Collins, 2008). Some legal histories seem to suggest that
judicial agency has played an important role historically (e.g., Hoeich, 1984),
while both anecdotal and survey evidence claim that it still shapes a pervasive
phenomenon in developing countries nowadays (e.g., Hellman et al., 2000).
5A few strands of econometric research have demonstrated the benecial
eects of judicial independence for economic growth and social welfare, devel-
oping numerous indicators and providing evidence that countries with strong
independence of judicial institutions enjoy higher economic performance and
political freedom. The seminal contribution of Feld and Voigt (2003) intro-
duces a twofold notion of judicial independence - de jure independence, as de-
scribed in the constitutional establishment of the supreme court, and de facto
independence, that is judicial independence as it is actually implemented in
practice; exploiting a cross-sectional sample they present evidence that only de
facto judicial independence is conducive to growth. In a related work, Feld and
Voigt (2004) also control for interaction eects conjecturing that other consti-
tutional arrangements such as the degree of checks and balances (Persson and
Tabellini, 2003) might - jointly with judicial independence - also have an im-
pact on economic growth. La Porta et al. (2004) use an international database
assembling measures of judicial checks and balances for seventy-one countries
to show that eective judicial independence and constitutional review account
for greater economic freedom.
In this paper, illegal lobbying is studied within a multi-institutional govern-
ment organization involving dierent types of actors and separation of powers.
A leading concern of our framework pertains to the relationship between judi-
cial independence and political corruption. We start from the simple hypoth-
esis that, being the likelihood of politicians being bribed strongly dependent
on the expected utility of engaging themselves in corrupt behavior, a higher
likelihood of the latter being detected and prosecuted should be correlated
with lower levels of political corruption.
Closely related to our work are the empirical contributions suggesting that
judicial dependence plays an important role in explaining high levels of corrup-
tion. Ades and Di Tella (1997) and La Porta et al. (2004) show that political
inuence over judicial institutions typically increases corruption. More re-
cently, Aaken et al. (2008) takes on an estimation strategy - based on the
construction of two ad hoc indicators of independence - in order to test the
hypothesis whether government power over prosecutors may raise government
members' incentives to misuse such power in order to prevent the prosecution
of illegal activities or crimes - like corruption - committed by themselves. The
cross country evidence provided in the paper shows that factual independence
of prosecutors is robustly signicant for explaining variation in political cor-
ruption.
3 The model
We consider an economy with a population of N individuals divided into
two groups indexed by k, of size n1 and n2 respectively, with
P2
k=1 nk = N.
Utility (welfare) is derived from disposable income, which is assumed to be
exogenous, and the consumption of pure group-specic public goods. Under
6homogeneous preferences within each group we have:
Uk = nkuk (1)
with the individual utility function characterized as:
uk = (1   t)yk + Gk(qkB)
where:
- yk denotes gross income for individuals of group k;
- t is the exogenously given tax rate on gross income;
- Gk() denotes utility derived from the public good qkB specic to group
k;
- qk  0 is the share of total tax revenue (B = t
P
k nkyk) dedicated to
nance the project that benets either group, with
P
k qk = 1;
- Gk is a twice-dierentiable function satisfying G0
k() > 0 and G00
k() < 0
for k = 1;2.
The eective redistribution scheme results from the interplay of two gov-
ernment institutions. While public policies are univocally determined by the
decisions of a Politician (P), their determination is inuenced by the behavior
of a separate institution, the Judiciary (J), which is given the role of trac-
ing illegal lobbying at the Politician's level. In a setting  a la Grossman and
Helpman (2001), an organized interest group k may indeed decide to make its
political contribution contingent on the selected policy by formulating a trans-
fer schedule Tk(qk) which maps any feasible value for the shares qk 2 [0;1] into
a non-negative contribution to P 3. In our simple economy, contributions are
assumed to be illegal whichever form or submission channel they might take
(outright bribes). As P will choose the policy vector (^ q1; ^ q2) which maximizes
its own objective, the joint (net) welfare of the members of the lobbying group
k is given as:
Vk = Uk(^ qk)   Tk(^ qk) (2)
We model a reduced form for the Politician's objective function, assuming
that xed weights are exogenously assigned to the welfare levels of the two
dierent groups in the economy4. When choosing the tax revenue shares qk to
be allocated for the production of the public goods, the policy-setting authority
P is thereby concerned with the public's well-being and with the receipts it
gets from the groups of interest. We explicitly allow for uncertainty in the
payment of the contributions - which mirrors the degree to which the policy
3We require the contribution function be dierentiable for strictly positive contributions.
4In our model, k reects political relevance and may represent population weights (e.g.,
when the Politician takes care of social welfare) or electoral weights (when the Politician is
concerned with reelection prospects).
7maker is actually captured by interest groups' claims - as linked to the presence
of the control activity undertaken by the Judiciary. This feature is modeled
by letting P benet from the eective transfers only with (known) probability











k kVk() is the social welfare aggregation with weights k > 0 for
k = 1;2, and
P
k k = 1;
- l > 0 denotes the (exogenous) degree of preference of P for (weighted)
social welfare relative to contributions.
Groups may dier in their ability to capture institutions and outbid rival
seekers of favorable policies. Given our concern in exploring the endogenous
interaction between multi-target lobbying and judicial control under dierent
hypotheses as to the integrity and independence of the Judiciary, for simplicity
the asymmetric case is considered where group 1 only is modeled as a bribe
provider5. To ease notation burden, we set q1 = q (and q2 = 1 q accordingly),
so that T(q) and b T  T(^ q) will denote the contribution function with which
the lobby confronts the Politician and the eective transfer eventually paid by
the lobby against the chosen policy ^ q, respectively. The payo function of P
reduces then to:




The judicial authority is in charge of an anti-corruption oce incidental
to the eective transfer of the contributions b T. In particular, we assume the
existence of one-to-one correspondences6 between the control activity carried
out by J and both the probability 1   f with which it traces the payment b T
and a cost, determined by an uni-variate function S, in terms of eort to be
exerted or resource allocation for the anti-corruption task to take place7. We
thereby consider f as the choice variable for J and denote with S(f) the cost
associated with any level of control activity:
S(f) = 
 1(1   f);  > 0 (4)
5We let then group 2 collect the rest of the population, so that the public good 1 would
represent a specic good in which group 1 is interested, whereas the public good 2 would
denote a generic basket of other goods.
6That is, of a pair of bijections, whose composition is bijective as well.
7It turns indeed dicult to believe that the probability f is observable by economic
agents. Therefore, we think of 1   f as a proxy of the level of eort or resource allocation
needed for the detection of outright bribes at the Politician's level, measured by the function
S(f). Observing the latter is of course equivalent to observing the shadow price of political
lobbying f.
8so that positively identifying any illegal contribution submitted to P is costly
but bounded from above (S(0) = 1=), while not identifying it involves no
cost at all (S(1) = 0)8. The positive parameter  is assumed to be a measure
of eciency for J's control activity; it summarizes the inuence of adequate
budgetary allocations, sucient number of sta, adequate training of sta on
the judicial work. Although eciency is only one aspect of the quality of
a Judiciary, it nonetheless is measurable, unlike some of the other essential
features (Dakolias, 1999).
As to the objective of J, in line with the expression for VP we assume that
the former reects the burden imposed by lobbying activities at the Politician's
level - in terms of costs of anti-corruption task and the discrepancy (measured
by the ex-post transfer T(^ q)) between the allocation resulting in the absence
of any dealings with the interest group and the lobby-induced one - as well as
the opportunity of beneting (constantly at the margin) from direct transfers
from the interest group:
VJ(f) = (1   )C(f) + [ S(f)   T(^ q)];  2 [0;1]
where  - the weighting factor placed on organization and social costs of cor-
ruption versus monetary transfers - is interpreted as J's level of integrity, and
C(f) denotes the contribution schedule tendered by the lobby. For the sake of
convenience, the previous expression - taken to be maximized over f 2 [0;1] -
is written in the following form:
VJ(f) = (1 + )
 1 [( S(f) + C(f))   T(^ q)];   0 (5)
where the scalar  =  1(1 ) can be regarded as the degree of corruptibility
held by the judicial authority.
We assume that the objectives (3) and (5) are common knowledge to P, J
and the organized interest group. In this context lobbying proves observable
but not veriable by the Judiciary unless contributions are detected through
its control activity. Also, we make a strong assumption in that, once identied,
the contribution b T is conscated but can neither contribute to nancing public
goods provision nor be of any utility for J.
4 Equilibrium analysis
4.1 One-layer lobbying
We rst investigate the case where only the political authority may be




 1(1   f) + T(^ q)

;  > 0
so that J's objective is given by the sum (with negative sign) of the cost of
the anti-corruption task as expressed by (4) and the ex-post transfer to the
Politician. The timing of the model is as follows:
8There is no sunk cost associated with the described control activity.
9(i) J selects the level of control activity, determining f;
(ii) the lobbying group 1 formulates the contribution schedule T(q);
(iii) P observes T(q) and sets the policy ^ q, the lobby pays T(^ q);
(iv) if not traced, the contribution is received by P.
We derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the model through
backward induction. A few preliminary comments are worth making. First, the
analysis is restricted to the equilibrium prole insofar as the results obtained
are invariant with respect to the form of the contribution schedule o-the
equilibrium. Also, the assumption that the bargaining power is fully allocated
to the lobby does not impose any restrictions on the equilibrium outcome of
the model. In our setting, the rst-mover advantage allows indeed the lobby to
fully extract the surplus. Yet, we may as well let the Politician and the lobby
share equally the gain or also allow the Politician to take it in full9. Crucially,
f is not taken to be a function of the size of the contribution T, which therefore
still enters additively the objective of the policy-setting authority; it follows
that under Nash bargaining - or any dierent bargaining structure with full
information whose solution is jointly (Pareto) ecient for both the contracting
sides - the equilibrium policy proves independent of the negotiation process
(Grossman and Helpman, 2001; Peters, 2003).
Implicitly it is assumed that, even if the Politician and the lobby choose
not to stipulate any contract, the relationship between the two is ongoing, so
that policies and schedules are adhered to in order to preserve the possibility
of future cooperation. Similarly, the Judiciary commits to carry out the costly
level of control as chosen in stage (i).
As to the stage of policy making, where f is predetermined, using (2) and





k(Uk   Tk) = (f




From this formulation, it is straightforward to note that P will give in
to the lobbying group (accepting b T) only if the probability of obtaining the
contribution exceeds a given threshold (i.e., l1). Indeed, a sucient condition
for the absence of lobbying can be stated in terms of the parameter restriction
l1  1; conversely, whenever the latter fails to obtain, the group of interest will
be able to bear down on the public agent P by means of political (monetary)
contributions only if the level of impunity enjoyed by the lobbying activity is
larger than the given threshold. More precisely, we have the following result:
Proposition 1. In the SPE of the model:
i) If l1  1, no lobbying emerges and P chooses ^ q = argmaxql
P
k kUk(qk);
9All these remarks also apply for the lobbying game between the interest group and the
Judiciary
10ii) If l1 < 1 and f  l1, no lobbying emerges and P chooses ^ q;
iii) I f > l1, the organized group lobbies P and obtains ^ qL > ^ q.
In the rst two cases, the lobby oers T = 0 and no interaction with the
public agent P takes place. The equilibrium policy for any f  l1 is implicitly












) = 0 (6)
Although the two possibilities bring about the same results in terms of
optimal choice by the Politician, they have no common source. In the rst
case, lobbying is not even feasible, because of the level of welfare-interest of
the Politician, that makes too costly for the interest group to pay contributions.
We dene this as the First Best (FB) equilibrium. In the second case, while
otherwise feasible, lobbying does not emerge because of the level of judicial
control. We denote this with the term Full Deterrence (FD) equilibrium. In
the former case therefore, the presence of Judiciary is non inuential, whereas
in the latter it proves fundamental.




such that ^ qL jointly maximizes the objective
function of P and the lobbying group, the latter acting as a principal11. The


























L) = 0 (7)
It is straightforward to note that the main eect of the lobbying activity
relative to the no lobbying case is to have the weight P grants its marginal
utility increased (since f > l1). Given the strict concavity of the utility
function, the budget share turns improved (^ qL > ^ q) so that U1(^ qL) > U1(^ q)
and U2(1 ^ qL) < U2(1 ^ q). Clearly, for the contribution T L  T(^ qL) to be an
10This requirement fully characterizes the optimal choice of P, since Uk is concave in
q1  q for k = 1;2.
11The equilibrium allocation must be jointly ecient for the organized group and
the policy-setting authority, that is ^ qL = argmaxq fV1(q)g s.t. VP(q;T(q)) 
VP(^ q)  maxq l
P
k kUk(qk). Computing the contribution TL required by full sur-
plus extraction, the ecient policy maximizes the payo of the lobby, that is ^ qL =
argmaxq ffU1(q) + l2U2(1   q)g, as required by equation (7). Again, the second-order
condition for ^ qL is guaranteed by concavity.
11equilibrium it cannot be lowered further without inducing the public decision
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It is evident that @TL









> 0 from (7), so that
from ^ qL > ^ q it follows T L > 0. This proves suciency for the last claim
of Proposition 1. It is worth mentioning that the participation constraint of
the lobbying group is not binding in equilibrium12, this meaning that, relative
to the no lobbying scenario, group 1 experiences an increase in its payo and
group 2 faces a decreased payo, with P not being worse o in the political
equilibrium by accepting the incentive contract.
Now we turn to the analysis of the rst stage of the game. In order to
perform its anti-corruption task, the judicial authority chooses the level of




over f, the probability
with which the contribution b T is eectively delivered to the public agent P.
While the operative cost S(f), in terms of eort or resource allocation required
by any control actions, suggests that weakening the anti-corruption activity
- by letting the level of impunity enjoyed by the lobbying group be high -
involves, at any eciency level , a benet for J, the eect of f on b T - which
is key to investigating how the Judiciary attempts to inuence the existence
and the magnitude of illegal contributions - is ambiguous.
Two dierent scenarios can thereby emerge. Under l1  1 Proposition
1 ensures that lobbying never occurs; with T = 0, every non-zero level for
the control activity of the Judiciary is of no use, and the optimal choice does
result in f = 113. Conversely, if l1 < 1 - a restriction which would be otherwise
sucient for lobbying to occur - the model allows us to derive a pair of functions
(^ q(f); b T(f)) which map from any value for f in [0;1] to the corresponding
optimal choice of P and the transfer eectively submitted by the lobbying
group, respectively, under which b T(l1) = 0 and b T(f) > 0 for all f larger than























12That is, U1(^ qL)   T(^ qL) > U1(^ q). This shows that the interest group has an incentive
to lobby P for any f > l1 chosen at the upper node.
13This justies our denition of First Best outcome, since no costly action by the Judiciary
is necessary to achieve the maximum welfare condition.
12This relation captures the equilibrium trade-o induced by an higher level
of impunity f. While the rst term in the right-hand side has negative sign
- an higher f grants the lobbying group a strong bargaining power, allowing
it to submit the lowest contribution satisfying the participation constraint of
P -, the second term turns positive as it reects the equilibrium responses of












@f < 0, and given condition (7), the higher the
value of f the larger the incentive distortion induced in the optimal behavior
of P as a welfare-maximizer and accordingly the higher the compensation to
credit to the public agent in terms of the contribution b T(f).
Given dierentiability and compactness assumptions, a solution to the op-
timization problem of J does exist. The following Lemma claims that there
always exists a lower bound for the eciency parameter  above which the
judicial authority will be able to fully deter political lobbying:
Lemma 1. Let l1 < 1. Then there always exists a nite threshold  such
that J prefers f = l1 to any f 2 [0;1] if and only if   .
Proof. - See Appendix A.
Therefore, Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 jointly show that in two cases only
the same equilibrium outcome14 can be achieved. The rst possibility trivially
obtains when lobbying is unfeasible, provided the Politician is suciently wel-
fare interested - that is, when l1  1. Otherwise, provided that requirements
of Lemma 1 are met, there would be no gain for group 1 in engaging into
political lobbying15.
Along the same chain of reasoning (assuming l1 < 1), f = 1 is chosen if
and only if  is lower than a given (nite) threshold  >  , since in that
case every level of control is too costly for J. As a consequence, no deterrence
obtains in the political equilibrium only when J proves highly inecient; with
intermediate values for , J could indeed prefer a dierent f 2 (l1;1), which
results in a political equilibrium with partial lobbying deterrence.
4.2 Two-layer lobbying
In this section, we investigate the possibility that, while being independent
of the political authority, J itself may be bribed by the pressure group. With
some algebra, it is possible to rewrite the rst term in the right-hand side of











)   U1(^ q
L)] + l2[U2(^ q
)   U2(^ q
L)]

14More precisely, the same result in terms of absence of lobbying - and hence of the optimal
shares ^ q
k - in the political equilibrium. As shown, the optimal choice of the Judiciary proves
dierent under the two circumstances. See also next note.
15This leads to our denition of Full Deterrence equilibrium, given the cost borne by the
public agent J for achieving the optimal condition as expressed in Proposition 1.
13which proves positive as the payo of the lobby group is a monotone function
of the level of impunity f. This clearly raises the question whether - and under
which conditions - it may turn optimal for the special interest group to lobby
the judicial authority at the rst stage of the game, by submitting contributions
contingent on J's decision. When faced with multiple access points to the
decision making, the analysis of the allocation of inuence activities calls for an
evaluation of the lobby's strategic behavior as to how best to exploit resources
to impinge on the process and which choices it should attempt to aect, while
accounting for the possibility that lobbying at one layer may not suce to fully
control reactions by the other.
The objective for the judicial authority is now given by equation (5), which
we repeat below, under the restriction  > 0:
VJ(f) = (1 + )
 1  
 




; ; > 0 (10)
whereas P's objective is given as:





Uk(qk)   Tk(qk)   Ck( ^ f)
o
(11)
where, according to our assumptions, only T1  T and C1  C can take on
non-zero values. The sequence of events therefore includes a preliminary stage
where interest group 1 decides whether to lobby J with a contribution schedule
C(f), and J selects the level of control activity to set up and therefore the
value ^ f maximizing (10), obtaining the matching monetary reward C( ^ f)  0.
Then, the same group 1 decides whether to lobby P by submitting a policy-
contingent schedule T(q), and nally the latter chooses a budget allocation
f^ q;1   ^ qg maximizing (11) and exchanged for T(^ q)  0.
At the lowest node, P cannot inuence the choice made by J on the level
of impunity to be granted to the lobbying activity, independently of the ability
of the group of interest to bribe the judicial authority. It follows that ^ f and
C( ^ f) are predetermined at this node of decision making and the expression for
the optimal T L( ^ f) is obtained as in the previous section.
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
is always positive for f 2 (l1;1] as the group of interest 1 is willing to lobby
the public agent J for this to grant an higher level of impunity to the lobbying
16Note that lobbying the Judiciary at this stage of the game is feasible insofar as  < 1
or  > 0.
14activity intended to aect P's choice over public spending allocation. It follows
then ^ fL  ^ f, with ^ f denoting the optimal choice resulting under no lobbying
at J's level.
We can thereby compute C( ^ fL) as the contribution which leaves J indif-
ferent between choosing ^ fL and keeping the level of control corresponding to
^ f:
S( ^ f
) + b T( ^ f
) = S( ^ f
L) + b T( ^ f









( ^ fL   ^ f)
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As an equilibrium requirement, the participation constraint of the lobbying
group must be satised, so we need to impose:
U(^ q( ^ f
L))   b T( ^ f
L)   C( ^ f
L)  U(^ q( ^ f
))   b T( ^ f
) (13)
Again, we look for the conditions under which the economy is able to
reach an equilibrium where no illegal transfer to both the public agents occurs.
Accordingly, we shall assume hereafter that    is always the case17, so that
from Lemma 1 it follows ^ f = l1. Corrupting the judicial authority via a
positive contribution would instead yield ^ fL: since  has been proven to be
the minimal level of eciency such that l1  argmaxf S   T(^ q)g in [0;1],
and since C(f) > 0 for f > l1, we have ^ fL > l1.
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
 U(^ q( ^ f
L))   U(^ q
)   b T( ^ f
L)
Since this holds for any   , we state the following:
Lemma 2. Let l1 < 1. Then there always exists a non-zero threshold  such
that, for a suciently high , J selects ^ f = l1 if and only if  < .
Proof. - See Appendix B.
Lemma 2 ensures that, for suciently low corruptibility levels, the prob-
lem is analogous to that dealt with in section 4.1. It identies a partition
of the parameter space  2 [0;1] in accordance with the threshold . A
zero-contribution equilibrium therefore obtains in the multi-target case under
identiable parameter restrictions. While for high corruptibility levels no equi-
librium without illegal transfers is achievable, even in the presence of maximum
17We have already shown that a contributions free equilibrium is not possible if  < 











Fig. 1: Feasibility of the Full Deterrence equilibrium.
eciency, for  <  a zero-contribution equilibrium is still feasible, conditional
on a suciently high level of eciency.
We now characterize the problem in terms of both the eciency and the
integrity of the Judiciary according to the following:
Corollary 1. Let l1 < 1. Provided that  < , there always exists a nite
 such that J prefers f = l1 to any f 2 [0;1] if and only if   . In
particular, we have  = () with d=d > 0
Proof. - See Appendix C.
The existence of a monotone mapping between degrees of J's corruptibility
and the minimal level of eciency needed for full deterrence to occur identies
a non-empty subset A  <++<+ in the parameter space such that absence of
lobbying in the political equilibrium obtains if and only if the pair (;) 2 A
(Figure 1). In other words, provided requirements of Lemma 2 and Corollary
1 are met, a level of enforcement that fully deters political lobbying may result
even in the presence of a prone-to-pressure Judiciary. The following claim
complements this insight:
Corollary 2. Let l1 < 1. Then f = 1 obtains if and only if  < () with
() > 0 and d=d > 0
Proof. - See Appendix D.
5 Lobbying under judicial dependence
This last section develops a slightly more sophisticated analysis in terms
of presence of a dependent or independent Judiciary. Herein, the aim of in-
quiry is not the reasons of existence of the judicial authority as an institution
16independent of the political arm of government but rather the discretion in
choice enjoyed by and the nature of the constraints imposed on the Judiciary,
as expressed by the mechanisms underpinning the independence of the judicial
branch from political interference. Rather than specifying how P and J are
appointed, we thereby formalize this feature by postulating that Nature always
selects the level of l (i.e. the level of welfare interest of the Politician) while it
chooses the level of  (i.e. the degree of corruptibility of the Judiciary) only
in the case of independence of J. Judicial dependence is then modeled as the
power acknowledged to the Politician to select the parameter 18.
The case of an independent Judiciary immune from political interference
corresponds exactly to our previous section. In that situation, l and  are
independently given, so that the regions of presence or absence of illegal con-
tributions are obtained under the requirements of Proposition 1 and Lemma
2. This scenario is depicted in Figure 2, which shows three possible regions
according to the thresholds  and  l = 1=1. Given Proposition 1, if l   l we
always achieve the First Best solution thanks to the welfare interest of the
Politician. If l <  l but  < , Lemma 2 applies so that we achieve the Full
Deterrence solution conditional on the eciency of the Judiciary being su-
ciently high. Only when the welfare interest of P and the integrity of J are













Fig. 2: Conditional Full Deterrence region.
Let us now consider the case of a dependent Judiciary. In particular we
allow Nature to initially choose l and , and give P the power to select J,
that is to change . We have thereby to consider the possibility that the lobby
contributes P also at this stage of the game to further their political ends. The
timing is as follows:
18Note that the model remains a game of complete and perfect information in that J and
P observe the outcomes of both the draws.
17(i) Nature chooses l and  independently;
(ii) the lobbying group 1 formulates the contribution schedule T I();
(iii) P chooses either to keep  or to change it into ^ ;
(iv) the lobbying group 1 formulates the contribution schedule C(f);
(v) J selects the level of control activity, determining ^ f, the lobby pays T I(^ )
and C( ^ f);
(vi) if not traced, T I(^ ) is received by P;
(vii) the lobbying group 1 formulates the contribution schedule T II(q);
(viii) P sets the policy ^ q, the lobby pays T II(^ q);
(ix) if not traced, T II(^ q) is received by P.
Note that in VP it results T  T I + T II. In the last stage of the game the
rst claim of Proposition 1 still applies and lobbying never occurs provided
l1  1. As to the solution of the game when l < 1=1, we prove the following:
Lemma 3. Let l1 < 1. In the SPE of the game:
i) P chooses the pair
n
^  ! 1;qL( ^ f = 1)
o
;
ii) J selects ^ f = 1;
iii) the lobby pays
n
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Proof. - See Appendix E.
Intuitively, the lobby prefers f = 1 to every other f 2 [0;1), since for any
f  l1, V1 = U(^ q) obtains, while for f > l1 it holds
@V1
@f > 0. For this
scenario to emerge, it needs a suciently low level of integrity of the Judiciary
and thus there exists an incentive for the special interest group to lobby P
at the rst stage: since both the payo functions of the lobby and of P are
decreasing in C, that is the contribution paid by the lobby to J, it proves
optimal for them to jointly set it to zero, which turns possible in the case of a
corruptible Judiciary only if its integrity is exactly zero. With an incorruptible
Judiciary, it is easy to show that the lobby and P share a common interest in
changing J and letting  ! 1; this result readily follows from observing that
@VP
@f is positive if T > 0 in correspondence of the optimal choice for q.
The equilibrium outcome under a dependent Judiciary is equivalent to that
resulting from a society where no such an institutional entity exists; in both the
cases indeed, the original nding of Grossman and Helpman (2001) obtains,
where the weight P grants the lobby within the choice of ^ qL is always as
18high as possible, i.e. f = 1. Importantly, we may observe that, according to
Corollary 2, the same conclusion results if P is allowed to determine the level
of eciency of the Judiciary, rather than integrity. In particular, it is easy
to show that there exists a (possibly zero) level of eciency for every level of
integrity of J, such that whenever P implements it J chooses f = 1 and never
claims a form of compensation to the lobby. Both the forms of dependence
(organizational as much as hierarchical) appear thereby to be detrimental in
the political equilibrium.
Regardless of how the Judiciary and the Politician are appointed, the like-
lihood of achieving the First Best solution never decreases. In fact, the pres-
ence of the Judiciary is redundant when P is suciently welfare-interested and
lobbying proves unfeasible, since any degree (and form) of institutional depen-
dence will bring about the same result. Conversely, when P is suciently
concerned with the contributions oered by the lobby (i.e. l <  l), entrusting
the political authority with power over J rules out the possibility of achieving
an equilibrium with (possibly partial) lobbying deterrence. A dependent Ju-
diciary would indeed act as the perfect agent of the policy maker. Conversely,
an independent Judiciary, even if corruptible, breaks the exclusive bargaining
channel with the political authority, and thus weakens the lobby's incentives
to engage in bribe-making, as the latter is more likely not to be able to create
large rents. This in turn might reduce total corruption19.
6 Conclusion
This paper addresses several issues pertaining to the inuence of a judicial
authority on the presence of illegal contributions that groups of interest may
choose to submit to a policy-setting authority with the aim of inuencing the
decision making upon the provision of public projects. An endogenous policy
model is developed where the ability of a lobbying group to impinge on the de-
termination of policies arises endogenously. In contrast to most of the related
literature, here the tendered contributions do not systematically reach the po-
litical authority once this has solved its decision problem. Rather, the stage
of lobbying is endogeneized in a framework where the transmission of mone-
tary contributions - in the form of bribes - relies on the judicial authority's
deterrence activity, whose level is unambiguously related to the probability of
revealing corruption. The political authority will accept the contribution only
if it is eectively secured with a given probability threshold. We nd that
the Judiciary plays a critical and heretofore unrecognized role in the shap-
ing of public policies. As a result, the set of feasible alternatives against the
status-quo may dier signicantly in comparison to the setting where no judi-
cial authority is considered. Whenever underdeterrence occurs in equilibrium,
19This insight is reminiscent of Rose-Ackerman (1978) argument that heightening the
number of individuals who must be bribed in order to achieve the desired outcome may in
fact be optimal.
19an increasing probability of reaching the political authority through the ille-
gal contributions translates into an increasing lobbying power of the group of
interest, with severe implications on the eective redistribution outcome.
As a modeling issue, the analysis presented herein investigates some rele-
vant features which are commonly presumed to exert some degree of inuence
on the decision making process at the judicial level. In particular, two sub-
stantive dimensions are highlighted: the eciency of Judiciary - which directly
aects the choice of the level of the control activity to establish - and its in-
tegrity - which is likely to induce distortions in court behavior. It is shown that
eciency and integrity both entail several implications for the eectiveness of
lobbying; in particular, we prove that, even when allowing for a corruptible Ju-
diciary, the control activity may prevent the group of interest from lobbying in
the political equilibrium, whenever the judicial authority acts in a suciently
ecient environment. Provided a fraction of judges is held not easy to capture,
improving eciency of judicial review may serve as a measurable (controllable)
instrument for accountability of this branch - since ecient judicial systems
may countervail special interest groups' inuence over prone-to-pressure courts.
Still, for low levels of integrity a corrupt Judiciary represents an insurmount-
able impediment to the functioning of the institutional mechanism designed to
curb corruption, however well-targeted and ecient, and no equilibrium with
zero contributions is achievable.
Finally, the main ndings are tested against dierent assumptions as to
judicial independence. Empirical studies on the topic suggest that the institu-
tional design of judicial authorities is likely to serve as a potential determinant
of political corruption. Our theoretical approach provides one potential expla-
nation for such evidence. In our framework, an independent, even corruptible,
Judiciary is shown to be superior to a dependent one, insofar as deterrence
equilibria are unfeasible under perfect (hierarchical as well as organizational)
dependence. The independence of the judiciary is therefore crucial to its eec-
tiveness, yet it is not sucient, insofar as a fair judiciary must also be subject
to mechanisms that hold it accountable for its institutional role. In a nor-
mative perspective, our results suggest that insulating judicial branches from
political interference should congure an important issue of institution design.
20Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1 First note that from b T(f) = 0 when f < l1, it follows
that J optimizes over f 2 [l1;1]. The Lemma is proven in three steps:
1. Consider I such that, for f ! l
+
1 , VJ(l1) > VJ(f), that is S(f) +
b T(f) > S(l1). The point l1 doesn't pose any discontinuity problem
as the one-sided limits from above and below are nite and equal to
b T(l1) = 0. Moreover, from b T 2 C2, it follows that b T is O(f   l1)
in a neighborhood of l1. The threshold value I is accordingly identi-
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2. Let ^ f = argmaxfVJg when  = I; if ^ f > l1, consider II such that























k=1 k[Uk(q)   Uk(qL)]
	 = II
3. Follow this iterative procedure until at N, ^ f = l1 obtains. A nite
N will exist as b T is bounded from below (i.e., b T  C on [l1;1], C is a
constant). We will then have  = N.
The rst step ensures VJ has a local maximum at f = l1. The second and
third steps ensure this is also the global maximizer in [l1;1].
B. Proof of Lemma 2 Assume  ! 1. Consider the upper bound of
the contribution paid by group 1 against ^ fL in this case. We can obtain it by
making equation (13) hold with equality (with b T( ^ f) = 0 from Lemma 1):
C( ^ f
L) = U(^ q( ^ f
L)))   U(^ q( ^ f
))   b T( ^ f
L) = U(^ q( ^ f
L))   b T( ^ f
L)
21We can now substitute it in the objective function of J to obtain:






[U(^ q(f))   b T(f)]
where V J represents the maximum value J could obtain by choosing f. Now
we show that there exists  such that for  <  the lobby could never guarantee
that J gains a payo equal to VJ(l1). From now on we consider - according
to the discussion in the proof of Lemma 1 - only f 2 [l1;1] and exploit the
multi-step procedure as follows:
1. Consider I such that, for f ! l
+
1 , V J(l1) > V J(f), that is  T(f) +

1+U(^ q(f)) < 0. We can rewrite this condition by adopting second-
order Taylor expansions of b T(f) and U(^ q(f)) around (l1):
 
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which in turn holds for:
 <






















RU   Rb T
 = I
2. Let ^ f = argmaxfVJg when  = I; if ^ f > l1, consider II such that
-T( ^ f) + 
1+U(^ q( ^ f)) < 0 which holds for:
 <
T( ^ f)
U(^ q( ^ f))   b T( ^ f)
= II
3. Follow this iterative procedure until at N, ^ f = l1 obtains. A nite
N will exist since, for  = 0, J chooses ^ fL = l1 since T(l1) = 0
and T(f) > 0 8f > l1, while, for  ! 1, J chooses ^ fL > l1 since
U(^ q(f))   b T(f) > 0 and T(f) is bounded. We will then have  = N.
22The rst step ensures V J has a local maximum at f = l1. The second and
third steps ensure this is also the global maximizer in [l1;1].
C. Proof of Corollary 1 It follows directly by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Note that if  is nite and positive, it is easier for the lobby to respect the
(IC) of J; in particular we can now rewrite the condition V J(f) V J(l1) = 0
for f > l1 as:
T(f)   [U(^ q(f))   b T(f)] + S(f) = 0
where S(f) is negative and decreasing in ; so we can obtain the mapping
from  to  of the values that respect this expression.
D. Proof of Corollary 2 The proof for  = 0 is similar to that of Lemma 1.
However in this case we need to show that f = 1 maximizes VJ in [0;1]. Dene
I = 1=T 0(f = 1). If  < I, T(1) is a local maximum for VJ. Now, consider
^ f  argmaxfVJg 2 [0;1]; if ^ f < 1 dene II =
1  ^ f
T( ^ f) T(1) < I. Iterating, we
can nd N = (0) such that f = 1  argmaxfVJg 2 [0;1]. Lastly, if for
 = (0) f = 1  argmaxfVJg, this is true 8 < (0) since VJ is decreasing
in  2 [0;1).
Now suppose a generic  > 0. We can nd () with the same procedure as
before; however, denoting with V C
J = V NC
J + C the payos of a corruptible
and non-corruptible J respectively, we note that now it is easy to respect all
the sequence of conditions since @C
@f is positive (and the amount that the in-
terest group is willing to pay to lobby J is maximum for f = 1). Starting
from I = 1=(T 0(f = 1)   C0(f = 1)), we can obtain another sequence that
converges to (). Since every term of the sequence is increasing in  - note
that every n after I looks like
1  ^ f
T( ^ f) T(1) (C(1) C( ^ f)) -, it follows that () is
increasing in .
E. Proof of Lemma 3: We solve again the game by backward induction:
1. In the third stage, given ^ f - that is, the level of control chosen in the
second stage -, we obtain q( ^ f) and T II(q( ^ f)) as before;
2. In the second stage, given ^ , ^ f and C( ^ f) are determined;
3. As to the rst stage, we begin determining the optimal solution for the
lobby. We previously showed that 8f  l1 V1 = U(q) while, if f > l1,
from
@q
@f > 0 and
@V1
@q > 0, it follows that
@V1
@f > 0 so that the lobby
strictly prefers f = 1 to any f 2 [0;1). Also, we can note that both




i iUi(q)   l2C( ^ f) and V L
1 = U(^ q)   T(^ q)   C( ^ f). From this it
follows directly that in the NE of the subgame it is jointly optimal for P
and the lobby to set f = 1 and C = 0. In particular, P chooses  ! 1
since this is equivalent to choosing f = 1 with certainty and determining
23b C = 0. To show this, we consider the optimal solution for the problem of






































so that for  ! 1 the solution to this problem coincides with the optimal
choice for the lobby, which was showed to be equal to f = 1. Lastly, from
(12), we can observe that C ! 0 as  ! 1, since the term in brackets
is bounded from above.
Accordingly, the whole game reduces to a single stage game where P
chooses the pair (1,qL( ^ f = 1)) and the lobby pays T I + T II, so that in
equilibrium it must be:
b T










L( ^ f = 1))]

However, the only time-consistent pair of T I and T II is given by T I = 0




k k[Uk(q)   Uk(qL( ^ f = 1))]

, since the lobby pays
T I prior to the decision over the policy qL.
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